“A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content” forthcoming in Synthese
“Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
“Justification: Propositional, Doxastic, Personal” (w/ K. Keller) to appear in The Routledge Companion to Evidence, edited by M. Lasonen-Aarnio, T. Dougherty, C. Littlejohn.
“Beliefless Knowing” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
“Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief” forthcoming in Episteme
“Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-order *Apparent* Evidence?” forthcoming in Inquiry
New paper coming out in
Upcoming talks at Australasian Association of Philosophy (@ Monash), La Trobe University, and the Eastern APA.
In this paper I’ve attempted to show that we can have an elegant account of justification that puts knowledge that first, while also doing justice to the variety of properties that epistemologists have long thought it possessed. The trick involves a bit of know how…
My thoughts on this are to appear here: