Forthcoming Publications

“A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content” forthcoming in Synthese


“Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies


“Justification: Propositional, Doxastic, Personal”  (w/ K. Keller) to appear in The Routledge Companion to Evidence, edited by M. Lasonen-Aarnio, T. Dougherty, C. Littlejohn.


“Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief”  forthcoming in Episteme

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“Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-order *Apparent* Evidence?” forthcoming in Inquiry



Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification. Forthcoming in Inquiry


Sometimes it’s reasonable to reduce confidence in a proposition in response to gaining etiological information. So long as reasonability and justification are distinct, this reasonability claim would appear consistent with the thesis that this kind of etiological information cannot, all by itself, affect one’s justification. In what follows I argue that this is mistaken. For, even if reasonability and justification are distinct, the reasonability of decreasing confidence in response to etiological information must be explained in terms of a decrease in justification. The argument to follow threatens not only the stronger thesis that etiological information never defeats justification but the substantially weaker thesis, advocated by various authors, that justification is defeated by etiological information in only a limited range of circumstances. I go on to show how the arguments en route to this conclusion have much wider epistemological ramifications.


How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence

New paper coming out in


Abstract. Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on ra- tionality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order ev- idence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification).