This unit was intended to introduce students to a variety of popular topics in recent epistemology. Our specific focus was on issues pertaining to epistemic justification—what it is, what it’s sources are, how it’s transmitted, and how it’s defeated (though not in that exact order).

Week 1. Introduction

Gettier, E. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” (Moodle)

Duncan Pritchard, “Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology” (Moodle)

Week 2. Defeaters and Positive Epistemic Properties

Bergmann, M. 2006. “Defeaters” in Justification Without Awareness, Oxford University Press.

Pryor, J. 2001. “Highlights of Recent Epistemology,” British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 52: 95-124.

Alston, W. 1989. “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” in Epistemic Justification, Cornell University Press.

 

Week 3. The Nature of Perceptual Justification: Dogmatism, Conservatism, & Liberalism

 

Silins, N. 2008. “Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 2, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Kotzen, M. 2012. “Silin’s Liberalism,” Philosophical Studies, 159: 61-68.

 

Week 4. The Transmission of Perceptual Justification: Closure, Transmission, and Moorean Responses to Skepticism

 

James Pryor (2004). “What’s Wrong with Moore’s Argument?” Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349-378

Tucker, C. “When Transmission Fails” Philosophical Review, 119 (4):497-529

 

Week 5. The Problem of Epistemic Circularity 

Bergmann, M. 2004. “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 709-727.

Reed, B. 2006. “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78: 186-197.

 

Week 6. The Problem of Epistemic Disagreement

 

Feldman, R. 2006. “Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement,” in Epistemology Futures, S. Heatherington (ed.), Oxford University Press.

Kelly, T. 2005. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 1, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford University Press.

 

Week 7. The Problem of Epistemic Incommensurability (or The Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreement)

 

Lynch, M.P. 2010. “Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability,” in Social Epistemology, A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds.), Oxford University Press.

Kappel, K. MS. The Problem of Deep Disagreement.

 

Week 8. The Nature of Intuitions and Philosophical Investigation

 

Pust, J. Chapters 1 and 2 of Intuitions as Evidence

Pust, J. “Intuitions,” Section III on Challenges and Defenses

 

Week 9. The Challenge of Experimental Philosophy

 

Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., and Stich, S. 2001. “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics, 29: 429–460.

Turner, J. 2006. “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 28-53.

Alexander, J. and J. Weinberg. 2007. “Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy,” Philosophy Compass, 2: 56-80.

 

Week 10. Responding to the Challenge

Liao, S. M. 2008. “A Defense of Intuitions,” Philosophical Studies, 140: 247-262.

Bengson, J. Forthcoming. “Experimental Attacks on Intuition,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.