November 11 I’ll be presenting some of my work at an interdisciplinary workshop on prejudice at:
The gist is that a Bayesian approach to the relationship between evidence and belief can neatly untie a variety of problems involving standard judgements about the epistemic irrationality of sexist, racist, and similarly problematic beliefs.
My paper (in progress) “Justification: Propositional, Doxastic, Personal” is to appear in The Routledge Companion to Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Trent Dougherty.
As of January 2017 I will be a visiting faculty member at
New paper coming out in
Abstract. Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on ra- tionality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order ev- idence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification).