Published Papers
1. “Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition,” Philosophical Studies, 2013

2. “Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,

3. “How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013

4. “On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs,” Erkenntnis, 2015

5. “Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015

6. “The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2016

7. “Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?“with M.P. Lynch, Journal of Philosophical Research, 2016 invited contribution

8. “Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification,” forthcoming in Episteme

9. “How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence,” forthcoming in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

10. “Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification,” forthcoming in Inquiry

11. “Justification: Propositional, Doxastic, Personal” to appear in The Routledge Companion to Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Trent Dougherty

12. “Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

13. “Justified Group Belief Is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief,” forthcoming in Episteme

14. “Can Worsnip’s Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-order Apparent Evidence?” forthcoming in Inquiry

Papers in Progress

1. “Does Knowledge Require Belief?”

2. “Bayesianism, Sexism, and Racism”

3. “How To Get From Baxter’s Hume to Garrett’s Hume”

4. “Irrational Credal Knowledge” (w/ Matt Lee)

5. “Sufficient Evidence Does not Entail Sufficient Reason to Believe”

6. “Awareness”

7. “Group Normativity and Social Constraints on Group Rationality”

8. “A Conceptual Analysis of Glory [or What it is to be awesome!]”

9. “Apparent Evidence and the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence”

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